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repertoire of contention, embodied in hisba, to changing circumstances, us-
ing violence where it felt it was necessary and applying other less aggressive 
methods or toning hisba down when it felt it was counterproductive. The flex-
ibility of hisba became apparent again when the movement was smashed and 
it could be transformed in revisionist writings into a principle supporting an 
Islamic civility. The irony of the new situation was that by that time the Jama'a 
al-Islamiyya found itself in a situation similar to that of the Muslim Brother-
hood. Hemmed in by an authoritarian and repressive regime, it relinquished 
all claims to creating an autonomous Islamic space and developed hisba into 
a weak instrument of claiming rights and reframing the relationship with the 
state as a contractual one of obligations and duties. 
8 HIZBULLAH'S WOMEN 
Internal Transformation in a Social Movement 
and Militia 
Anne Marie Baylouny 
HOW AND WHEN DO MOVEMENTS TRANSFORM? Change in social movements has 
been attributed to external, structural political opportunities and to repression, 
generating either moderation or radicalization, respectively. Locating all change 
outside the movement, however, neglects large categories of change, particularly 
the agency of members. Even when the influence of members is acknowledged, 
it is still generally limited to internal political battles for control or is viewed as 
reflecting changes in external political opportunities. Yet factors outside politi-
cal opportunities can change members' priorities for the movement and their 
view of their own place in it. Economic and historical factors falling outside 
social movement analysis can profoundly affect extant members, while new 
constituencies and generations can enter the movement with different ideas. 
Particularly in the developing world and in authoritarian countries, much mo-
bilizing takes place within the informal, everyday realm and within movement 
institutions-such as social services and the media-that are not geared to for-
mal politics. In short, Social Movement Theory (SMT) as currently formulated 
omits the capacity of members, in realms outside those geared to formal politics 
or control of the organization, to affect the movement as a whole. 
In this chapter I begin the task of melding historical, gender, and everyday 
perspectives with SMT to delineate the dynamics of internally driven trans-
formation within a movement. Gathering data on internal change, as opposed 
to externally induced change, is difficult. Witnessing debates and deliberations 
within a movement can be impossible for outsiders, especially in groups la-
beled as terrorists. With the rise of media information technology, then, a new 
public view of the movement is afforded for some organizations through their 
own media. Media can provide insight into the battles and configurations of 
power within a movement. Media shows who participates, giving a view of the 
movement's community including its peripheral and occasional adherents be-
yond its core, activist constituency. 
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Studying the gender programming on the television station al-Manar 
of the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah facilitates analysis of intramove-
ment transformation and the factors responsible for the specific direction 
of this value change. Women's programming on al-Manar demonstrates a 
transformed vision of women and their place in the movement and in so-
ciety. along with the surpassing of religion as the predominant idiom of the 
movement, and the abandoning of reliance on an exclusively Shi'a and re-
ligious constituency. The debate and variety of views in talk programs on 
Hizbullah's television-assumed to be a propagandistic mouthpiece-yield a 
different picture of a movement that accommodates and even facilitates dis-
cussion beyond its core stances. These programs promote gender equality in 
work and housework, a diminution of male prerogative, education and ca-
reers for women, married or not, and an end to domestic violence, broadly 
construed. Contrary to talk shows that promote one expert opinion, these 
discussions focus on the audience and their ideas. The method of commu-
nication is not dictatorial but contains significant community participation, 
ending in no single, authoritative solution. Pushing the bounds of ideology 
to include the secular, the programs do not promote secularism but do ac-
tively include other religious communities and the nonreligious. Women's 
programming is a window into substantive movement transformation, par-
ticularly since private life-women and the family-has been considered the 
last domain closed to debate in Eastern and Western societies alike. Tolerance 
of change and diverse lifestyles within the family is a strong indicator that 
change has taken place. 1 
] argue that these substantive developments in Hizbullah's media are due 
to the central role of women in the organization. This is clear not only from 
the prominence of women in the media but also in shifting norms that entail 
changes in male roles-a situation that departs from nationalist movements' 
promotion of modern women for the movements' own purposes. l begin by 
theorizing movement transformation and value change, and the differential 
power of subconstituencies. I discuss prior conceptions of women in the or-
ganization and their mobilization due to war. I then introduce the media and 
Hizbullah, delineating how the organization has changed over time. Women's 
programming demonstrates the depth of this change, as it encompasses shift-
ing boundaries of the community, changed norms for the family and for men, 
and an embrace of Western and specifically American concepts of rights and 
civil society.1 
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MOVEMENT TRANSFORMATION AND SUBCONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE 
SMT commonly ascribes movement change to external political opportuni-
ties, such as elections, or to the denial of opportunity through repression:' This 
prime role attributed to structural factors neglects agency and change from 
within the movement itself (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). Understanding move-
ment transformation necessitates moving beyond political opportunities and 
events outside the movement to internal dynamics. 
Various internal dynamics can change a movement. Movements depend on 
their memberships' approval, tacit or active, of their stances. While many analy-
ses focus on leaders, other evidence indicates that members themselves have a 
strong role in movement direction (Wickham 2004). Organizations are subject 
to internal authority contests that can determine the direction of the move-
ment (Kurzman 1996). Schwedler's (2006) comparison of two Islamist parties 
concludes that internal factors such as decision-making practices and leader-
ship structure were important variables. Where members had more of a say 
in the group's direction, the Islamist group could evolve over time by redefin-
ing the boundaries of legitimate behavior and practice. Clark and Schwedler 
(2003) demonstrate that Islamist women were able to promote their own role in 
their organizations, taking advantage of divisions and spaces left while Islamist 
men were occupied with other concerns. In Hamas, the leadership actively 
sought member input on the trajectory of the movement through question-
naires (Mishal and Sela 2002). Ultimately members can resign in protest; over 
five hundred women walked out of an Algerian Islamist party en masse, declar-
ing that the party did not listen to them.4 More generally the literature on fram-
ing insists that movement messages and symbols resonate with the grassroots 
membership. Leaders must craft their messages in line with the culture and pri-
orities of potential supporters (Snow et al. 1986; Swidler 1986). 
The influence of members is recognized by SMT but is attached to the in-
ternal political battles of the movement, or is in response to changes in the 
formal political realm. The notion of "the political" itself must be enlarged. 
Much transformation occurs through both the dynamics of everyday life and 
member involvement in movement institutions that are not geared to formal 
politics. Institutions such as social services that are not aimed at elections are 
recognized as having a political impact, as are informal networks (Singerman 
1995; Clark 2004a). These institutions affect the movement, although the over-
whelming focus of research on Islamist movements has been on how such in -
stitutions aid the leaders' stated goals; research has neglected change that arises 
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from members in these institutions. Bottom-up change can occur from realms 
not focused on elections or on control of the organization. 
How and why the underlying priorities and preferences of the constituen-
cies change has been analyzed as historical fact outside of the models of social 
movements. SMT's bias toward the formal and overtly political neglects the 
politics of the everyday--encompassing history, economic conditions, infor-
mal networks, and prior activism and agency to name a few areas-and the 
ability of these everyday politics to ultimately alter the power dynamics within 
movements (Bayat 2010 ). I link what Bayat terms the feminism of everyday life 
to social movement analyses in order to understand the real-life changes within 
a key Hizbullah institution. I argue that female members are making changes 
spurred by daily life within a realm that is not overtly political, the movement's 
media. This power results from the position of women as a key constituency 
supporting the organization's military roles. 
Members do not all matter equally to tl1e movement; internal power differ-
entials exist. The specifics of whose approval matters (and when it matters), of 
how desires are communicated, and of how different types of members, vary-
ing external conditions, and potential constituencies affect internal movement 
transformation are unclear. The membership of a movement is made up of a 
number of subconstituencies such as youth, women, core or original mem-
bers, and new members. A subconstituency's importance to the movement can 
be historical and symbolic, or current and either organizational or strategic. 
The different roles can coincide, as when a subconstituency is a symbol of the 
movement's founding, is integral to the daily functioning of the organization, 
and represents the potential for strategic alliances with other groups deemed 
part of the group's strategy for success. When one subconstituency holds all 
three roles, that group has a wider range to maneuver within the organization 
and can push for new points of view. To determine which groups hold such 
positions, a historical analysis of the movement's founding and development, 
along with an assessment of its current position in the political structure and 
its future goals, is necessary. 
Women can be an important subconstituency organizationally. The organi-
zational needs of Islamist movements to mobilize large constituencies place a 
premium on organizing the general population (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007). 
As in other religious movements, while men are the visible face of the movement, 
women perform the grassroots daily functions that have built and sustained 
those movements (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). Women in Islamist or-
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ganizations have been associated with increased public participation; for ex-
ample, as they reached out to peasant women in Turkey (Arat 2005). Women 
participate in large numbers in Jordan's Islamist party (Clark 2004; Clark and 
Schwedler 2003 ) , in Hamas (Cobban 2006), and in Islamist movements gener-
ally (Nachtwey and Tessler i999). 
Women in Hizbullah represent a confluence of important roles. A core con-
stituency of the organization, women were symbolically affirmed for generating 
fighters by giving up their husbands and sons, and for supporting the resistance 
generally. Women are integral to the current daily operations of the organiza-
tion. The Women's Association of Hizbullah outfits the fighters, and women 
run the large and prominent social services network, which generates much 
prestige, legitimacy, and new members. Beyond filling internal organizational 
needs, women are able to bridge the gap to new constituencies for the organi-
zation. Women's prominence has increased as Hizbullah has sought to institu-
tionalize itself within the Lebanese arena-or "Lebanize"-making itself a fully 
national actor. Here women are a political symbol, as they often are through-
out the world. Certainly in the Muslim world, in the proclamations of both 
Islamists and their opponents, women and the family are a central focus. For 
many, the vision of a veiled woman means women's oppression, and the pros-
pect of an Islarnist group being a powerful political actor in Lebanon conjures 
preconceived ideas regarding an Islamist lack of regard for minority and wom-
en's rights. Women are an essential part of the modernity discussion, as they 
have been central concerns of the West, colonizers, socialist Arab states, monar-
chies, leftists, and Islamists alike (Abu-Lughod 2002; Editorial: Sexuality, Sup-
pression and the State 2004; Brand i998; Browers 2006; Zine 2006). Lebanon is 
not only a country with a significant and politically involved Christian commu-
nity but also one intensely tied to the West. By allowing space for contemporary 
and progressive women's issues to be discussed in its media, with the participa-
tion of Christian scholars, experts, and audiences, Hizbullah communicates tol-
erance for diverse female and minority lifestyles. 
Women or other subgroups have power in a social movement when their 
contribution is integral to the movement. But that power is limited by threats to 
the organization's survival, which take precedence. The substance of this power, 
what it is used for, and its duration depend on the larger employment structure 
of society and women's integration in the movement during the protracted po-
litical struggle Gramsci terms a "war of position." Societal context, history, and 
economic development matter. Educated professional women able to fill roles 
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in the movement beyond traditional or even violent ones have a reticulating ef-
fect in the Lebanese context, reinforcing the progressive stance of the organiza-
tion toward women and its need to rely on and cultivate this source of support.5 
THE MEDIA SPHERE OF HIZBULLAH 
Media programs are windows into movement debates. Arab media and the use 
of information technology have exploded in recent years, as has movement 
use of media. According to some, the proliferation of new Arab media and estab-
lishment of hundreds of new satellite stations have altered the face of Arab civil 
society and created a new public sphere (Lynch 2006; Anderson 2003; Eickel-
man and Anderson 2003) . The dominant Arab television, such as al-Jazeera, is 
regional because national or state media is mainly censored. But there is a third 
type of media that is partisan or sectarian (Cochrane 2007), joining party and 
media. Such stations broadcast a definite point of view and do not attempt 
neutral journalism. Pioneered during the Lebanese Civil War, when each militia 
established its own media, government and opposition factions now have their 
own television stations. This is a growing trend. Stations of Islamist groups, 
sectarian groups, and militias in Iraq and Hamas are some examples. The In-
ternet has been an especially prolific domain for sectarian messages. Younger 
generations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have aired their internal and 
sometimes politically sensitive debates on Internet biogs (Lynch 2007). 
This type of television is not new; political parties worldwide own their 
own media. Yet the relationship between a political party and its media has not 
been theorized. Anshu Chatterjee (2004) shows that such television expands 
beyond simple transmission of the party line in order to respond to market 
and global competition for an audience, as do other media. In her Indian case, 
both the media affiliated with the local political party and that owned by the 
national state competed successfully with the transnational media corporations 
in the marketplace of ideas by providing local-language programming that fo-
cused on a wide spectrum of local issues in order to maintain their constituen-
cies. While it does communicate a point of view, party-owned television cannot 
be considered simply propaganda. 
Al-Manar (the beacon, or lighthouse) is the land and satellite television 
station of Hizbullah, an Islamist social movement, militia, political party, and 
participant in government. Hizbullah began its television station in 1991, broad-
casting locally in Lebanon. Beginning as a "resistance media," a station linked 
to the fight of Hizbullah against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon 
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(Jorisch 2004), al-Manar's start was politicized and religious. In May 2000 al-
Manar began transmitting by satellite. It is generally available throughout the 
Arab world, and in Lebanon over land, but is banned in Europe and the United 
States. Al-Manar has bureaus and correspondents around the world, and is most 
famous for its coverage ofHizbullah's military operations against the Israeli army 
in southern Lebanon, through reporters "embedded" with Hizbullah troops. It 
has also been viewed as one of the new, politically independent media (Sharabi 
2003). Al-Manar operates in a media environment where political media are the 
norm (Dajani 2006), with channels such as Future TV, the representative of Leb-
anon's governing coalition. 
Hizbullah and its media have changed over the years. Both have become 
more sophisticated, addressing themselves to a broader audience not based on 
religious sect (Dellios 2000 ). This "Lebanization" process, or becoming more 
Lebanese than Shi'a and changing the community references accordingly, was 
sped up by two major events in Hizbullah's history (Harb and Leenders 2005; 
Alagha 2006). The first was the decision to enter the 1992 Lebanese elections 
as a political party, which necessitated a decision to relinquish the goal of an 
Islamist state. Second was the withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Leba-
non in 2000, which has been viewed as causing an identity crisis for Hizbullah, 
since the original justification for the organization's militia was fighting Israelis 
in the south. The second Palestinian intifada began soon after the withdrawal 
of the Israelis, possibly substituting issues for the station. But the station and 
Hizbullah also broadened their community of reference, attempting to reach 
additional audiences (Hamzeh 2004; Dalla! 2001). Two recent events changed 
al-Manar further. The 2005 removal of the Syrian army from Lebanon left Hiz-
bullah on its own and arguably sped up the Lebanization process. Al-Manar 
has become critical and open to contending points of view in its cross-fire pro-
grams in order to increase its viewership and expand its support. For the same 
reason, interviews began to encompass all the communities and political ideol-
ogies in Lebanon.6 This constituency broadening was partly challenged by the 
effects of the July 2006 war with Israel, which promoted militarization of the 
party and affirmed the public relations value of al-Manar to the military. 
Women-centered programs have been almost completely ignored in re-
search on the station, despite their being aired more than any single program 
except the news. Research has focused almost exclusively on news and spots 
promoting Hizbullah. Women's programs are aired nine times a week for a total 
of thirteen and a half hours. One women's weekly program recently celebrated 
its one hundredth episode. The oversight in research reflects a bias of male and 
(the few) female researchers alike-an assumption that these programs are 
pure propaganda and need not be studied, or a belief that women in an Is-
lamist organization would surely be portrayed negatively.7 Indeed all media in 
the Arab world are generally viewed as promoting a negative, traditional, and 
submissive view of women (Allam 2008). Even al-Jazeera is seen as promoting 
a traditional view of women, contrary to its promoted self-image of challeng-
ing the Arab status quo (Dabbous-Sensenig 2006). Yet women have entered the 
Arab public and media spheres, changing the dialogue considerably (Mogha-
dam and Sadiqi 2006; Skalli 2006). Sakr (2004) argues that the Middle Eastern 
media has become more pro-female as a result of the entrance of women. 
WOMEN AND CHANGING NORMS 
The substantive ideas currently depicted on Hizbullah's media represent a sig-
nificant change from the organization's stand at its founding.8 At first, women 
were not much dealt with except that they should adhere to what Deeb (2006) 
has called "authenticated Islam," the version of Islam that rejects tradition for 
modern religious practices and interpretation. The emphasis was on the unity 
of the Shi'a community, women's duty to that community, and their role in sup-
porting fighters and producing the next generation. Motherhood and women's 
public demonstration of religious practices and piety were prized (Deeb 2006; 
Zaatari 2003). Women and men fulfilled equal but distinct complementary 
roles in society, and family duties were women's first priority (Firmo-Fontan 
2004). During the ongoing fight with Israel, Hizbullah utilized a discourse that 
emphasized male military achievements or "confrontation and triumphant 
masculinity" (Holt 1999). The United States along with Israel were the enemies, 
and relations with the Lebanese Christian community were extremely poor 
prior to the end of the civil war, in 1990. 
The progressive ideas now aired on al-Manar appear counterintuitive. Leba-
nese Islamist women suffer from conditions often held to decrease women's sta-
tus: they are not only involved in a revolutionary organization that has engaged 
in warfare (promoting male fighters), but they are also Islarnists. Women's path-
breaking roles in revolutionary organizations, either as combatants or major 
supporters, have not been lasting. While they are almost universally used in the 
rhetoric promoting militarization (Bayard de Volo 2004), women in conflict situ-
ations are typically seen as victims during and after war (Al-Ali 2005; Henderson 
and Jeydel 2007). After the Algerian revolution (Turshen 2002) and World War II 
in the United States, gender boundaries were not permanently affected, as women 
returned to their role as homemakers. Nationalist and right wing movements 
have prioritized the nation over women; even when women's organizations fight 
to assert their status, their gains have been forsaken in the name of the nation and 
male employment (Henderson and Jeydel 2007). In Islarnist movements images 
of policing women's dress and conduct in public space come to mind. 
War can be a catalyst for widespread changes in women's notions of their 
possibilities and rights, and their vision of optimal family relations. Women 
may take on new, transforrnative roles during conflict. Rights-based struggles 
have often come out of other struggles. For example, the US women's movement 
grew in part from dissatisfaction with women's status in the civil rights move-
ment (McAdam 1995). Although such roles can alter accepted boundaries of 
public versus female private spheres, men typically do not regard them as threat-
ening, since they contribute to confronting the enemy: from carrying munitions 
to visiting prisoners and even taking up arms. Under conditions of repression 
when male political opportunities are limited, women's realm for maneuver 
can open (Noonan 1995). In some cases the lack of men, due to death or im-
prisonment, has spurred women to take their place. Women are not universally 
peaceful. They join militias and terrorist groups (Shehadeh 1999; Ali 2005) . Such 
political activism can be transformative (Sharoni 2001). The bravery and risks 
these women assume can alter perceptions, as was the case with female journal-
ist during the war years in Lebanon (Abu-Fadil 2007). The traditional realm of 
women in these circumstances extends from family to community, justifying a 
broad realm of activism under conditions of conflict or repression that can pro-
mote alternative views of women's correct role. In some instances the role of 
women caretaking and improving society may continue after war, expanding 
their previously private-sphere duties to the public in peacetime (Bayat 2010 ). 
The observation that popular conflict and religious mobilization can be 
positive for women is qualified by their employment and educational status, 
their position of importance within the movement, and their external ref-
erences. The dynamic of expanding women's rights and self-image in a pro-
gressive direction depends on women themselves pushing the boundaries and 
taking advantage of opportunities in the party. Previous experiences when 
women did not consolidate gains from conflict may be situational rather than 
perennial outcomes, contingent on the ability of women to hold important 
(educated) positions within the organization and on their institutional impor-
tance to the organization. 
___________ ..... __ ...... ________________ ___ _____ ____ __ 
I argue that Lebanese Islamist women benefited in some ways from the 
civil war and from their mobilization in an Islamist group. The case of Hizbul-
lah's women confirms the conclusions of a Carnegie study that the entrance 
of educated women into Islamist parties is partly responsible for those parties' 
increasing attention to women's issues (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007). Broad 
economic changes have generated many of the issues discussed here, particu-
larly around women working outside the home (Taraki i995). 
WOMEN'S PROGRAMS: 
PROGRESSIVE ISSUES AND INCLUSION ON AL-MANAR 
Women's programming on al-Manar demonstrates value change in several 
areas. The view departs from that of women solely serving religion, the family, 
and nation, and goes beyond the promotion of"modern" women as evidence of 
the organization's achievements. The programs push the boundaries of male-
ness along with femaleness and bring the intimate sphere of the family into 
open debate. The programs advance individual rights for women and children, 
not communal ones as Islamist groups often do, and they accept international 
concepts of human rights. Further the community participating in the pro-
grams is multiconfessional, incorporating, physically and rhetorically, respect 
for different religions and ways oflife. Where the United States has been viewed 
as anathema, here American norms and research findings are presented as au-
thoritative, to be admired and imitated. Lastly the programs and the range of 
programs on the station are multivocal, not uniform, indicating that segments 
of Hizbullah's constituency are promoting views that other parts oppose, and 
that this diversity of views is being played out partly in the media. 
The multiple voices on al-Manar are a significant change from Hizbullah's 
roots and image in the West as a monolithic and authoritarian organization. 
These programs tackle core issues of family and private life presenting multi-
ple views from experts who are often not religious and not even Muslim. One 
women's program, Problem and Opinion, was previously named Problems and 
Solutions (Mashakil wa-hulu[), demonstrating the shift to multiple voices and of-
fering no authoritative solution. Some programs are remarkably nonideological 
and devoid of Hizbullah's religious rhetoric, while others present problems from 
a more religious and traditional point of view. 
A heterogeneous, nonideological, and nonreligious community is par-
ticularly apparent in two women's programs. I recorded data on guest dress 
for twenty-nine episodes of one program: 57 percent of guests were unveiled 
women in Western dress; 11 percent were veiled; and 33 percent were men. Often 
the only one veiled on stage was the hostess. Seven percent were religious lead-
ers; they appeared particularly during programs whose content, such as adop-
tion, men contributing to housework, societal restrictions and stereotypes of 
divorced women, and violence in the family, pushed the boundaries. A sub-
stantial number of the unveiled women and many men were Christian, which 
was apparent either from their names or language use. Some were unable to ex-
press concepts except in French, or peppered their language with French words 
(in one case a professor could hardly speak Arabic but kept speaking in French 
while the hostess translated). The audience and callers mirror this pattern. Au-
diences for one program were half nonveiled. (In these programs audience, 
callers, and participants were predominantly although not entirely female.) In 
Problem and Opinion a skit is acted out to illustrate the problem for that week, 
presented by a viewer. The skits demonstrate veiled and nonveiled women, de-
pending on the week. In another example a Christian man brought a problem 
to the station, indicating that different religious communities participate in all 
capacities on al-Manar; they also turn to this Shi'a station for help. 
Religious solutions and interpretations were marginalized. Hostesses would 
ignore (the very few) comments coming from the audience or callers that reli-
gious practices were the solution. In one case an audience member stated that 
memorizing the Qur'an was a solution to the day's question, which focused 
on raising the self-esteem and confidence of all family members ( Wujhat 11azr, 
10/7/o7). The hostess cut him off and did not repeat the question to the guest 
when the latter had failed to hear the question. "Never mind," she stated, and 
moved on to ask the guests another question. During the same show, a caller at-
tempted to remind the audience of the need to confront Israel and of the needs 
of the nation, and the hostess cut him off. Despite the occasional presence of 
sheikhs on the programs and more often their call-in opinion at the end of the 
show, religion itself was almost completely absent as a solution, and then the 
interpretation was ecumenical. 
Women are substantially present in al-Manar, not only in the audiences 
mentioned above but also in its journalistic work (Abu-Fadil 2007; Firmo-
Fontan 2004). Women host thirteen out of twenty-four programs, and two 
more that have both male and female hosts. They are not present merely for ap-
pearance but are hard-hitting and assertive, interrupting and cutting off guests 
and callers, including sheikhs. A woman is the face of Hizbullah's international 
English language program. The two women's weekly programs demonstrate 
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views, such as questioning marriage itself, that are sometimes an extreme, pro-
gressive departure, certainly from traditional standards but even from many in 
Western countries. The programs promote a more equitable distribution of re-
sponsibility and tasks among all family members. This includes more respon-
sibility for men in sharing housework, from chores to childcare. The subject of 
one program was care of the house, and men's role in it ( Wujhat nazr, 3/13/08). 
The assumption was that women work outside the home. The audience, mainly 
men, protested. One man stated that he works all day and comes home tired. 
The hostess responded, "OK, your wife works outside the home all day too, and 
then comes home and works inside the house. Do you see the problem here?" 
The sheikh stopped short of demanding that men help out but asserted that 
they should, and that this is religiously approved. Similarly where a stepmother 
is involved, it is the man's responsibility to be aware of what occurs between his 
new wife and his children. If they are oppressed, it is his duty to protect them 
( Wujhat nazr, 4/24/ 08) . This issue also demonstrates a new spin on an old prob-
lem, placing duties on the husband in the old situation of combined families. 
Outside work for women is seen not only as economically necessary but also 
as fulfillment for a woman, an outlet for her own separate source of self-esteem. 
No longer does a woman just marry and have children; now she should not 
marry unless she has a profession and diploma in hand. When a woman had a 
problem with her rebellious children, the first thing the guest experts wanted to 
know was whether she had her own life and her own work (Mushkila wa-rai', 
2/4/08). The woman could be feeling empty and unfulfilled and be placing her 
life expectations onto the children, and that is negative. Promotional spots show 
girls at the computer, and suggest that a girl's future could be as a doctor and 
that she should be encouraged. In the midst of news coverage commemorating 
the third anniversary of the historic (for Hizbullah) March 8, 2005, demonstra-
tion, which coincided with International Women's Day, the news "shed light on 
different examples of women." It began with a profile on a woman running her 
own photography studio with her husband. "They say behind every great man 
is a woman, but what if next to every successful woman is a successful man who 
encourages her as she does for hin1." Her husband taught her photography, and 
he stated that she was now better than he. Another working woman's situation 
was different: her husband died, but like the other woman, said the narrator, she 
did not give up. "I am everything to my kids .... Just because my husband died 
doesn't mean my life is over." The social and legal rules have changed regarding 
women's work, the narrator stated, easing women's access to work. 
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Domestic abuse by fathers was the subject ·of a segment of another program 
(Mushkila wa-rai', 7/7/08). This demonstrated the consciousness of traditional 
practices being out of line with the rest of the world; the acknowledgment of 
the patriarchal system, but not the acceptance of it; changed economic pros-
pects for women and the family; and information globalization as a solution. 
The woman, a thirty-year-old Yemeni teacher who had not married in order to 
help support her family, was being beaten along with her sisters by her father. 
The woman turned to the Internet to write and ask for help from al-Manar in 
Lebanon. She could not take it anymore, she wrote; even knowing that society 
taught her father these behaviors, she was a university-educated woman and 
could not tolerate the lack of respect. She could not stand a society where "the 
word of the father is all and a mother has no opinion." 
The acceptability of women remaining unmarried is a departure from tra-
ditional and religious views of women. An episode called "Women Under the 
'Microscope"' focused on the treatment of divorced women (Mushkila wa-rai', 
4/14/08). Divorced women are looked at disrespectfully, treated differently, 
and assumed to be easy or willing to marry anyone. "This woman has paid the 
price," the sheikh said, "and has twice been oppressed, by her husband and now 
her family." In another case' a thirty-five-year-old woman refused all propos-
als for marriage and wondered what was wrong with her (Mushkila wa-rai', 
3/17/08). She was a professional and supported her family. The host stated that 
this situation is increasingly common. As men migrate and women become 
more educated and enter professions, women's demands of men change. No 
longer do fathers tell women what to do; this is no longer allowed. The ad-
vice of the guests was both essentialist and progressive. On the one hand, she 
was taking the role of a man, the guest stated, and there cannot be two men in 
the family; on the other, the guests affirmed her ability to live this life and the 
acceptability of her staying unmarried. The sheikh, consulted by phone, pro-
claimed that if she was happy, she did not need to marry. Partners in marriage 
need to share, each bringing some important capital--emotional, material, or 
i~tellectual-to the marriage, he stated. Girls unfortunately are raised to be-
lieve that their goal in life is marriage, and that life ends with it. Girls live with-
out freedom, waiting for marriage, a view he argued against. This woman was 
mature and conscious, and could make her own life choices. 
The appropriateness of diverse lifestyles is viewed as relative to the fam -
ily's or the community's lifestyle. On one program guests stated that they had 
heard of fathers staying home and mothers going to work. How that would 
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work would depend on the particular family. Styles of female dress, quite con-
troversial, were judged relative to their surroundings. In a discussion of rape it 
was mentioned that some people attribute rape to a woman's dress style. The 
guest responded that this is a sensitive topic, and some people could feel she 
was provocative if she dressed a certain way; however, if one lives in a country 
where women dress that way, people should get used to it and understand that 
it is not provocative. 
The reputed xenophobia of Hizbullah, or at least its animosity to the United 
States, is not evident in these programs. American scientific studies are used as 
proof and to demonstrate points. Western countries are lauded for their safe 
houses for battered women, their creativity-inspiring education, and the strong 
role of civil society. Hostesses discuss needing to "think outside the box"-
stated in English and translated into Arabic-and the importance of "quality 
time." Arab education is derided and compared negatively to education in the 
West, which encourages free thinking. In one program discussing spanking, a 
caller decried the discussion of alternatives, saying that especially at this time 
of cultural onslaught Easterners and Lebanese should stick to their culture. He 
was completely ignored by the women in the audience and the hostess, who 
simply moved on with their discussion. The audience, veiled and nonveiled, 
Christian and Muslim, working and stay-at-home mothers, all agreed they 
should find alternatives to spanking but were frustrated as to how they could 
still discipline their children. This demonstrates a consensus on ideas also be-
coming the standard for the international Western world. And "quality time" 
was again discussed in the context of mixing work with family care. 
In addition to domestic violence, other violent situations in daily life were 
presented as serious problems. Violence against children, and teachers hitting 
students, were portrayed as wrong. One program for youth discussed the list 
of human rights for children, showing UN posters of children's rights ( Taht 
al-'ashrin, 4/11/08). Violence portrayed in video games was another problem, 
particularly since the way to win the game was to kill. This was a value the 
women's program did not want imparted to children (Mushkila wa-rai', 7/21/08). 
Embracing Western solutions and norms for numerous daily life issues does 
not translate into protest against Hizbullah's militia or its foreign policy. Rather, 
women's use of Western studies, idioms, knowledge, and experts suggests a dis-
tinction between opposition to Western foreign policy and opposition to every-
thing Western. The two can and do coexist in numerous societies, as women 
eschew violence in their personal lives but partake in war, even supporting pa-
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triotic aggression. While support for progressive women's rights can coexist 
with support for an aggressive foreign policy, the foreign policy concerns or 
threats take precedence. In times of foreign crisis or during religious events, all 
programming is preempted, marginalizing coverage of women's issue. Threats 
to the movement generate a retreat and prioritization of the military, pushing 
all other discussion and debate to the sidelines until the crisis ends. 
Furthermore not all programs within Hizbullah's media align with these 
views. Programs such as To the Heart (Ila al-qalb) present a religious view of 
family and personal life. This spectrum of views on the media is a sign of open-
ness to multiple constituencies, while attempting to maintain the old ones. 
Space is afforded for diverse segments of Hizbullah supporters and potential 
supporters. According to Firmo-Fontan (2004), many watch al-Manar selec-
tively for particular programs. For some segments of al-Manar's audience the 
difference between religious or political programs and women's programs is 
not a contradiction. For others, particularly nonreligious viewers or those from 
other religious communities, the women's programming is distinct from Hiz-
bullah's view of the news. 
The variety of voices on the station is not unlimited; it is arguably affected 
by self-censorship, a situation comparable to that observed in Western media. 
Callers using insulting language toward a person are cut off; in other cases the 
caller's position, if contrary to the program, is ignored. No statements cross-
ing the line of disagreement with Hizbullah itself as an organization were wit-
nessed. This could be because of the high degree of approval of Hizbullah in 
Lebanon or the nonparticipation in the television shows of those in disagree-
ment. In the case of the 2005 elections al-Manar broadcast a series ("Word to 
the Nation") in which civil society leaders were asked their opinion on Hizbul-
lah's militia. Some voiced disapproval of the militia; most did not. However, 
some voiced other misgivings about the organization. 
CONCLUSION 
The dynamics of internal movement transformation can illuminate core 
changes in organizations. The views aired on Hizbullah's women's television 
programs are nontraditional and in some cases overtly opposed to inher-
ited patriarchal norms. While Hizbullah's view of women generally could be 
characterized as more progressive than the views of many groups, states, and 
media in the Arab world, women are going beyond this on the television sta-
tion, challenging male privilege. They deploy a rights-based discourse that is 
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individual, not communal; that is, elevating the priorities of the individual 
above those of the community. Solutions to problems, when offered at all, are 
multicommunal and multivocal, suggesting an openness to diverse lifestyles. 
Violence in daily life and society is eschewed. 
The concerns of the subconstituency of women have changed. Middle-class 
and working women's concerns are apparent in these programs. Some women 
in the organization, having lost a husband to military battles, are now single 
mothers supporting families; wage work is necessary. As a result of their in-
creased entrance into the workforce and professions, women have encountered 
barriers to full inclusion and have experienced the double standard enjoyed 
by men, particularly in the home. They believe that Islam does not endorse 
this double standard, as many are believers and have fought in an Islamist or-
ganization. Women are crucial parts of the organization, both on the logisti-
cal support level in outfitting fighters, and increasingly in the performance of 
professional tasks in Hizbullah's media. Women have taken advantage of their 
importance and pushed the boundaries. Clerics have conceded their points or 
have at least not contradicted them on these programs. 
Gender programs reveal a different side to Hizbullah regarding interna-
tional affairs as well, embracing as they do global information and the use of 
American studies as positive examples. The progressive gender ideas and the 
use of the West as a role model for civil society do not translate into nonvio-
lence in foreign policy. Domestic and societal nonviolence coexist easily with a 
foreign policy of fear and belligerence toward the enemy. Indeed foreign policy 
concerns set such movements as Hizbullah off from the usual social movement 
cases. The sense of external threat and the fear of attack strongly influence the 
direction of programming, creating tension and even halting the sphere of de-
bate and exploration of domestic and social issues. The result is not the civil 
society imagined by the West, although it may hold many of the same values as 
the West. Hizbullah's programming is inclusive, creating alliances and expand-
ing the community instead of limiting the community to Shi'is. While it is at-
tractive to other communities as progressive and participatory, the framework 
of a religious party and militia remains. 
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